OT & Industrial Cybersecurity Saudi Arabia
Operational technology inverts the usual priorities: availability and safety come first, and an assessment method that risks the process is worse than the gap it would find. We work passively by default and agree every active step in advance.
Where OT programmes begin
- The NCA OT controls now apply and no OT asset inventory exists.
- IT and OT networks are connected in ways that were never formally designed.
- Vendors hold remote access into plant systems that nobody monitors.
- Controllers run firmware that cannot be patched and no compensating control is documented.
- An operator has issued cybersecurity requirements down the supply chain.
What we deliver
Passive asset discovery
Controllers, HMIs, historians and protocols identified by listening, not probing.
Zone & conduit design
IEC 62443-aligned segmentation, then verification the boundary actually holds.
Secure remote access
Brokered, recorded vendor sessions replacing shared VPN credentials.
Protocol-aware monitoring
Detection that understands industrial traffic and normal process behaviour.
Compensating controls
Documented, approved mitigations where equipment cannot be patched.
OT incident response
Playbooks for environments where you cannot simply isolate and reimage.
Assess → Remediate → Secure → Assure
Assess
Understand your risk and compliance position.
Remediate
Close gaps with prioritized solutions.
Secure
Deploy the right technologies and controls.
Assure
Maintain continuous compliance and resilience.
Not sure where you stand? A short scoping call establishes what applies to you and what the work would involve. No obligation. Discuss OT Security →
The frameworks that govern OT
| NCA OTCC | The primary measure for operational technology estates in the Kingdom. |
| IEC 62443 | The international reference for industrial control system security, used alongside OTCC. |
| Aramco SACS | Supplier and contractor requirements across the Aramco ecosystem. |
| Functional safety | Security measures must not compromise safety instrumented systems — assessed together. |
What you receive
- Passive OT asset inventory with protocols
- Zone and conduit architecture
- Segmentation verification results
- Remote access control design
- Compensating control register with risk acceptance
- OT-specific response playbooks
Related services and insights
Frequently asked questions
Will the assessment put our process at risk?
Not the way we scope it. Discovery is passive by default — we listen to network traffic rather than probe devices. Anything active is agreed with plant engineering, scheduled into a maintenance window, and we will drop a technique entirely rather than accept process risk.
Our PLCs cannot be patched. Is that an automatic failure?
No. Unpatchable legacy equipment is normal in industrial estates and assessors know it. What they expect is a documented compensating control — segmentation, access restriction, monitoring — with residual risk formally accepted. An undocumented gap fails; a documented mitigation does not.
How is OT monitoring different from IT monitoring?
It must be passive, understand industrial protocols, and model normal process behaviour. IT alerting rules generate noise in OT and miss what matters. Deployment differs too — usually a network tap rather than agents, since agents on engineering workstations are often prohibited by the vendor.
Do you cover the IT side as well?
Yes, and the boundary between them is usually where the real risk sits. Most OT incidents begin in corporate IT and cross over. We assess the connection points, the jump hosts and the remote access paths as deliberately as the plant network itself.
Ready to start?
Tell us where you are and we will tell you what the work actually involves — scope, sequence and timeline, before any commitment.
Discuss OT Security